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BILLS AND NoTEs - HoLDER IN DuE CouRsE - BURDEN oF PROOF
WHERE THERE IS A WANT OF CONSIDERATION BETWEEN IMMEDIATE PARTIES - Plaintiff, transferee of a promissory note and a conditional sale contract, brought suit on the negotiable promissory note, and alleged that he was
a holder in due course. Defendant answered that there was no consideration for
the note. Held, that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show that he
was a holder in due course by section 59 of the Negotiable Instruments Law 1
which provides: "Every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder in due
course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated the
instrument was defective, the burden is on the holder to prove that he or some
person under whom he claims acquired the title as a holder in due course."
Industrial Loan & Trust Co. v. Bell, 300 Ill. App. 502, 21 N. E. (2d) 638
(1939).
This case is opposed to the great weight of authority.2 However this court
has support for its view in decisions in Michigan,8 Louisiana,4 and Oklahoma/
these decisions also being under the N. I. L. Thus it appears that the act has,
in this situation,6 failed to fulfi1 its purpose, that of establishing a uniform rule
for negotiable instruments in the forty-eight states. The same situation existed
prior to the act, a small minority holding that want of consideration placed on
the holder the burden of proving that he was a holder in due course.7 Under
the N. I. L. there are two sections applicable to this situation, sections 59 and 55.
The former provides that every holder is deemed prima facie to be a holder
in due course unless it is shown that the title of any person who has negotiated
the instrument was defective. Section 55 then defines a defective title as follows: "the title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective within
the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or any signature
thereto, by fraud, duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an
illegal consideration, or when he negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such
circumstances as amount to a fraud." 8 Since section 55 does not include want of

Adopted in Illinois in 1907-111. Ann. Stat. (Smith-Hurd, 1935), c. 98, § 79.
BIGELOW, BILLS AND NoTES, 3d ed., § 498 (1928); BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAw, 6th ed., § 59 (1938); Wheat v. Goss, 193 Ind. 558, 141 N. E.
311 (1923).
8 Jones v. Turner, 249 Mich. 403, 228 N. W. 796 (1930).
~ Stevens v. Sonnier, II La. App. 398, 122 So. 894 (1929).
8 Central Nat. Bank v. Pyeatt, 97 Okla. 28, 222 P. 533 (1924).
6 "This situation" deals solely with the question of where the burden of proof
lies in establishing whether or not the holder is a holder in due course, when there is
want of consideration between immediate parties. It has no relation to the problem
of where the burden of proof lies in establishing whether or not the negotiable instrument was issued for a valuable consideration.
1 Thompson v. Sioux Falls Nat. Bank, 150 U.S. 231, 14 S. Ct. 94 (1893);
Estabrook v. Boyle, I Allen (83 Mass.) 412 (1861).
8 Enacted without alteration by the legislature of Illinois. Ill. Ann. Stat. {SmithHurd, 1935), § 75.
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consideration as a "defective title" it would seem that such defense does not
shift the burden of proof to the holder to prove that he is a holder in due course
under section 59. This is the general interpretation that the act has received. 9
The argument in favor of this view is well stated by the Missouri court in the
case of Hill v. Dillon,1° overruling prior cases,11 decided contra under the
·N. I. L. The court there said that the statute had been carefully drawn, and
want and failure of consideration had been treated in section 28. Therefore, it
could not be doubted that the drafters had considered want and failure of consideration when section 55 was drawn, and had they intended them to create
a. "defective title," they would have said so with the same clearness of expression
that appears throughout the act. The argument in favor of the view expressed
by the principal case is not as easy to analyze. From the decisions however, it
appears that the courts look only to section 59 of the act, and stop there, so far
as applying the act is concerned. The courts then say, without reference to
section 55 of the N. I. L., that want of consideration is a defect in title, so the
burden shifts to the holder to establish that he is a holder in due course.12 It seems
that the majority view, contra to the principal case, is in accord with the clear
intent of the act.

lames A. Lee

9 Title, Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Pam, 232 N. Y. 441, 134 N. E. 525 (1922);
Tilden Lumber & Mill Co. v. Bacon Land Co., n6 Cal. App. 689, 3 P. (2d) 350
(1931); Lister v. Donlan, 85 Mont. 571, 281 P. 348 (1929); Lawrence v. Tennessee
Valley Bank, 224 Ala. 692, 141 So. 664 (1932); Moyses v. Bell, 62 Wash. 534, u4
P. 193 (19n); Standing Stone Nat. Bank v. Walser, 162 N. C. 44, 77 S. E. 1006
(1913).
10 176 Mo. App. 192, 161 S. W. 881 (1913).
11 Johnson County Savings Bank v. Mills, 143 Mo. App. 265, 127 S. W. 425
(1910); Birch Tree State Bank v. Dowler, 163 Mo. App. 65, 145 S. W. 843 (1912).
12 Central National Bank v. Pyeatt, 97 Okla. 28, 222 P. 533 (1934); Johnson
County Savings Bank v. Mills, 143 Mo. App. 265, 127 S. W. 425 (1910); Birch
Tree State Bank v. Dowler, 163 Mo. App. 65, 145 S. W. 843 (1912).

